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WAYS OF PERCEIVING AND MAPPING 
HUMAN COGNITION THROUGH ART*
abstract
This paper discusses the question of how art might reveal important aspects of human cognition by 
taking as a starting point Alva Noë’s book Strange Tools. Art and Human Nature (2015). I argue that the 
enactive approach defended in this book has strong affinities with some recent art-historical approaches 
that take their cue from cognitive neuroscience, such as neuroarthistory (Onians, 2016). My main claim is 
that the extended mind thesis, which is implied in both approaches, fails to capture important aspects of 
the cognitive underpinnings of artistic practices. Finally, I bring into focus Noë’s ambiguous position with 
respect to the role of perception in aesthetic appreciation. What good comes from distinguishing between 
various ways of seeing while at the same time holding that art appreciation is a matter of value and 
judgment rather than perception and response?
keywords
enactivism, human cognition, aesthetic perception, neuroarthistory
*  This paper is based on a talk presented at San Raffaele Spring School of Philosophy 2017. I would like to thank Alva 
Noë and the audience at this meeting for insightful comments, as well as an anonymous referee for Phenomenology 
and Mind. I presented parts of this material at the Summer School 2016: East Asia and ‘the West’: The Question 
of Anthropological Constants held in Berlin in July 28-August 7, 2016, at the Higher Seminar in Aesthetics at the 
University of Uppsala in February 2017 and at the conference of the French Society for Aesthetics in Paris in May 19-
20, 2017. I am grateful to audience members on those occasions for valuable discussion, especially to Jacques Morizot, 





WAYS OF PERCEIVING AND MAPPING HUMAN COGNITION THROUGH ART
 In his book Strange Tools. Art and Human Nature, Alva Noë (2015) makes two strong claims with 
respect to the human engagement with art: the first claim is methodological and refers to the 
idea that art practices should be regarded as tools of intelligibility of human nature, providing 
a meta-level understanding of ourselves (p. xii); the second claim, which is related to the first, 
refers to the nature of perception and to the possibility of there being a particular way of 
seeing artworks, namely, what Noë calls “aesthetic seeing” as opposed to “wild seeing” (pp. 
51-52). In this paper, I will look into these two problems that touch upon human cognition 
and its relation to the arts. More specifically, I hold that Noë’s commitment to the view that 
art unveils aspects of human nature gains in intelligibility when situated “in the context of its 
embedding” (p. 29) – just like the strange tools he refers to – and this context is provided by 
some recent art-historical developments informed by empirical sciences. 
In the first part of the paper I focus on the methodological claim that presents art practices 
as second-order activities, mapping our cognitive life (p. 30). Furthermore, I argue that Noë 
may have more in common with the very approaches that he sets out to criticize, namely the 
approaches grounded in cognitive neuroscience. In the last part of the paper I compare John 
Onians’s neurobiological approach to aesthetic appreciation to Noë’s enactive approach and 
highlight some of their inconsistencies. Enactivism, no less than neural approaches to art 
appreciation in their radical reductionist versions, may neglect important aspects concerning 
the cognitive underpinnings of appreciative practices.
First of all, consider the hypothesis that art practices are epistemic, second-order activities 
mapping the material world by sampling carefully the representative parts of it, just as 
regularly maps do. This epistemic hypothesis is deep-rooted in the tradition of philosophical 
aesthetics at least since Baumgarten. In his latest book, Alva Noë makes a case for another 
epistemic virtue of artistic practices, namely the potential of art to map the inner world 
of the art perceiver and to provide a basic sense of self. In other words, art can serve to 
delineate not only the outer world but also human cognition,1 operating in a similar manner 
to the geographer’s map; hence the idea of “art as mapmaking” (p. 30). As Noë states in the 
1  This point is also made by Noël Carroll (2017, pp. 234-235), who rightfully observes that Noë, in stressing the art’s 
quality of putting on display certain activities, he focuses mostly on cognitive practices, at the expense of other 
practices, such as moral or political. 
1. Introduction




following passage: “art provides us an opportunity to catch ourselves in the act of achieving 
our conscious lives, of bringing the world into focus for perceptual (and other forms of) 
consciousness” (p. xii). Thus forms of art such as “poetry, choreography, painting and 
photography and so on” would bring to consciousness and give a sense of basic actions such as 
“acts of talking, dancing, making pictures etc” (pp. 29-30). The discussion is reframed in terms 
of a hierarchy of levels, where level 1 comprises these latter, first-order activities, while level 
2 comprises the different arts, understood as second-order activities illuminating the first (p. 
29). Strikingly, this view parallels Franz Brentano’s (1894-1911/2008, p. 101) understanding of 
the mental act as having two objects, in this case, the object of contemplation, say, a canvas or 
a piece of music, and the contemplation or awareness of the very act of seeing or listening. Art 
would thus trigger self-reflection, allowing us to attain knowledge of our cognitive life, more 
specifically, of the ways we perceptually engage with the world.
Initially limited to forms of “experientialist art”, which are intended to explicitly 
reveal aspects of the perceiver’s experience,2 thus serving as a means of “first-person 
phenomenological investigation” (Noë, 2000, p. 133), Noë ultimately extends his argument to 
all forms of art. A further modification is that it is no longer clear whether the alleged artistic 
investigation of experience is situated at a personal level. In what sense are we supposed to 
attain knowledge of our cognitive life through art exposure? What kind of self-knowledge 
or self-awareness would be in play? Noël Carroll, for instance, takes this form of awareness 
elicited by art practices to be an act of reflection, occupying the foreground of consciousness 
(Carroll, 2017, p. 215), but Noë’s more general engagement with the embodied approach may 
contradict this view. Departing from the Brentanian tradition, Noë seems rather to hold 
that the artistic investigation that gives access to knowledge of the self takes place at the 
embodiment level; it would be carried out through an immediate bodily engagement with 
the artworks not through an introspective exercise generating internal representations. As 
Noë writes, the embodiment level is situated “between subpersonal and conscious level” 
(Noë, 2015, pp. 8-9, 218), hence any form of introspectionism that would rely on self-reflexive, 
transparent mental processes would be discarded. Therefore, the level at which activities 
like dancing, making pictures etc. would be put on display for us is neither the level of the 
subpersonal biological processes that causally underpin certain behaviors (e.g. sensorimotor 
abilities), nor the level of conscious awareness, of deliberate, controlled action, since we pay 
no particular attention to the processes that enable us to see or interact with an environment 
(Noë, 2004, p. 30). If my understanding of Noë’s overall argument is correct, then the 
appropriate level would be this intermediate, embodiment level, where there is no sharp line 
between personal and subpersonal processes, between the states of the organism and the 
conscious experience of the individual.
How could then art “unveil us to ourselves” (Noë, 2015, p. 101) and “reorganize us” (p. 29) 
while at the same time occupying this intermediate position so elusive to grasp? In order to 
illuminate this issue it would be helpful to compare the concept of “subpersonal level”, in 
Noë’s terms, with the concept of “pre-reflective self-consciousness”3 in phenomenological 
terms. On the one hand, the subpersonal level as understood by Noë is concerned with 
automatic processes such as sensorimotor activity, which do not reach explicit awareness 
(Noë, 2004, pp. 30-31, 218-219, 228). For instance, I can adjust the movement and the force of 
2  Such aspects of experience to which art may draw attention are the perceiver’s bodily movements, his or her 
environmental embedding, the temporal dynamics of perception etc. For instance, Brigitta Zics’s project The Mind 
Cupola, which feeds on the spectator’s cognitive and affective states, is an extreme example of “experientialist art” 
that puts literally on display human cognition. See Brigitta Zics (2011, pp. 30-37).
3  I am grateful to an anonymous referee for making this suggestion. 
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my hand grasp while trying to reach a glass bauble without paying attention to the process 
of grasping itself. Such process would not be necessarily reflected in the phenomenology of 
my experience. On the other hand, the notion of “pre-reflective self-consciousness”, which 
has been recently revived by Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi (2008, p. 46), refers to a type of 
implicit awareness of the self that does not require higher-order, reflective processes such 
as introspection. This notion leaves open the possibility that some sensorimotor abilities 
such as one’s bodily movement or posture, motor or visual coordination etc. may be after 
all part of one’s conscious awareness, securing some minimal sense of a self (pp. 49-50). The 
phenomenological approach is consistent with Noë’s embodiment approach, which doesn’t 
rule out the possibility that sensorimotor abilities become features of experience; in Noë’s 
terms, a minimal awareness of these abilities would occur at the embodiment level. But surely 
art unveils aspects of the self other than purely sensorimotor contingencies. What alternative 
to this view could there be? In what follows I will try to answer this question by drawing on art 
historical theories inspired by psychology.
The enactive approach to which Noë adheres is based on the assumption that the organism’s 
transactions with the environment are crucial for human cognition. Yet these transactions 
are not usually transparent to us; “we are organized but are lost in the nesting, massively 
complicated patterns of organization” (p. 28), as Noë remarks. And this is where art comes 
in, “investigating the modes of our organization, or rather, the manner of our embedding in 
different modes of organization” (p. 28), by isolating our basic activities from their settings, 
by making them peculiar and thus manifest to us (pp. 29-30). As argued above, it not clear to 
exactly what extent these activities are considered to become manifest through art. Leaving 
this question open and moving forward, I would like to draw attention to the fact that 
artworks themselves, as products of skillful activity and modes of reorganization in their own 
right, are equally embedded within a setting, which we as well take for granted and most of 
the time disregard. If Noë acknowledges as background setting first-order activities (seeing, 
walking, talking etc.), out of which art practices arise (2017, pp. 239-240, 242), what I have in 
mind is the art historical context itself, in which artworks are generally located. To paraphrase 
Noë, we make art of out art not only out of basic activities (p. 242). In an interpretation of one 
of Gombrich’s most famous aphorism – “there is no such thing as art. There are only artists” 
– Noë (2015, p. 112) hints at the temporal embedding of artworks, observing that there can be 
no essential definition of the abstract category that we call “art” but only a “story”, a narrative 
that connects more or less arbitrarily particular art practices and individuals that take part 
in these practices: “art is always … an engagement with other art, with artists, and audiences, 
and teachers and students” (p. 112). Now, it is my contention that if we laid more emphasis 
on this temporal and contextual embedding rather than on the strangeness or singularity of 
the individual works of art, we would start to have a good grip on the problem of unveiling 
us to ourselves through art. What I am suggesting is that we may have to appeal to an 
explicitly reflective research practice such as art history in order to bring to the foreground of 
consciousness the distinctive manner in which artworks elicit self-knowledge. Trying to “work 
this one out for ourselves” (Noë, 2017, p. 249) while rejecting any contribution from available 
science might not lead us very far (Carroll, 2017, p. 221). 
The question how art might reveal important aspect of human cognition was for instance 
at stake in Gombrich’s writings but also in George Kubler’s seminal book The Shape of Time. 
Remarks on the History of Things (1962). Kubler had this intriguing idea of a manifold portrayal 
3. Embedded Tools 




of the art historical time, which would be divided according to series and formal sequences,4 
treated as akin to solutions to problems that the artists seek to solve: “every man-made thing 
arises from a problem as a purposeful solution” (p. 7), he said. The artistic forms would be 
studied independently of their individual, symbolic meaning, and always in time, they would 
be appreciated by series, not taken in isolation: 
A pleasure shared by artists, collectors, and historians alike is the discovery that an 
old and interesting work of art is not unique, but that its type exists in a variety of 
examples spread early and late in time. Much of our satisfaction in these circumstances 
arises from the contemplation of a formal sequence, from an intuitive sense of 
enlargement and completion in the presence of a shape in time (Kubler, 1962, pp. 
40-41). 
The problems disclosed by these formal sequences, the original quest which lies behind 
all this would have “enlarged the domain of the aesthetic discourse” (p. 40), a domain 
which, according to Kubler, “concerns affective states of being” (p. 40). The artistic styles of 
naturalistic depiction (pictographic, photographic etc.) and the depiction of ornament could 
be examples of such problems, as are illustrated in Gombrich’s writings. Thus, in a certain 
sense, art is shaping the understanding of various states of mind. By disclosing these problems 
art historians trace in fact the history of different facets of our cognitive life, different 
“affective states of being” which lead to the creation of specific art forms. Seen in this light, 
Gombrich’s (1973) famous definition of art history as “the forging of master keys for opening 
the mysterious locks of our senses to which only nature herself originally held the key” (pp. 
201-202) becomes particularly relevant for Noë’s thesis regarding human nature as unveiled 
through art. The definition continues as follows: “Like the burglar who tries to break a safe, 
the artist has no direct access to the inner mechanism. He can only feel his way with sensitive 
fingers, probing and adjusting his hook or wire when something gives way” (pp. 201-202). 
The “keys” or “solutions” that happen to fit into such biological or psychological locks are 
forged through artistic strategies. In sum, the artist appears as a burglar that tickles our inner 
mechanisms by these funny keys that we call artistic techniques. For Gombrich, art is a matter 
of creation rather than imitation (1963, p. 3) or mere transcription of nature; more specifically, 
art is a matter of creation of “substitutes”: thus, a stick that we can ride on qualifies as a hobby 
horse5 just as a witty caricature qualifies as a portrait: “There are inventions in the history 
of art that have something of the character of such an open-sesame, [such as] the clues to 
expression discovered by humorous art. The question is not whether nature “really looks” 
like these pictorial devices but whether pictures with such features suggest a reading in terms 
of natural objects”. The reading to which Gombrich refers has nothing of an illusionistic 
character, in the sense of being fooled by a pictorial device such as perspective, as Noë claims 
(2015, p. 107-108). Gombrich’s psychological understanding of art amounts to saying that we 
respond in a certain manner when we are “keyed up” by exposure to particular artistic styles. 
The “keys” that fit into these psychological locks – or strange tools, if you like – are mere 
4  “The closest definition of a formal sequence that we now can venture is to affirm it as a historical network of 
gradually altered repetitions of the same trait. The sequence might therefore be described as having an armature. 
In cross section let us say that it shows a network, a mesh, or a cluster of subordinate traits; and in long section that 
it has a fiber-like structure of temporal stages, all recognizably similar, yet altering in their mesh from beginning to 
end” (Kubler, 1962, p. 33).
5  Other examples: “the cat running after the ball as if it were a mouse, counterfeit coins which make the machine 
work when dropped into the slot” (Gombrich, 1973, p. 4).
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substitutes, second-order representations of the world, becoming more and more refined 
through artistic strategies. Being keyed up by these techniques does not fall under the “trigger 
experience conception” of seeing (Noë, 2015, p. 97) deplored by Noë. 
In order to illustrate this idea of art as creation of substitutes with a specific example, we 
can take an extreme case offered by John Onians (1996, p. 206), where culture plays no role, 
namely, “a story of emulation” set at a dolphinarium. It is a story that tells the natural 
emergence of a creative behavior that is not the product of the god within the artist, so to 
speak; moreover, this natural story stands in stark contrast to the canonical art history, as 
we know it today. We are thus provided with an alternative version of the artistic discourse, 
one that locates the processes of creativity within broader contexts. Here’s a full description 
of what happens at the dolphinarium: “When a human blew a cloud of cigarette smoke at 
the pool’s glass just as an infant dolphin (Dolly) looked in, “she immediately swam off to 
her mother (Lady Dimple), returned and released a mouthful of milk which engulfed her 
head, giving much the same effect as had the cigarette smoke. Dolly subsequently used this 
behaviour as a regular device to attract attention” (Tayler, Saayman, 1973, pp. 290-291). 
This story of emulation refers to the well-debated topic of the origin of art-making and its 
basis in inborn dispositions or in other words, to the question of knowing what caused the 
appearance of such behaviors and why they still stand the test of time. The engravings found 
some 30, 000 years ago imitating the form of animals and later on human figures also nourish 
this myth concerning the origins and the biological interest of art making. Here we have a 
case of mimesis presented as an exercise of visuomotor coordination, that is, synchronizing 
visual information (the puff of cigarette smoke) with physical movement (blowing milk 
in order to obtain the same effect). The dolphin attains this performance at once, by 
observational learning (Tayler, Saayman, p. 291).6 What is interesting is that ethologists rule 
out individual acquisition by trial-and-error learning whereas art historians, and Gombrich 
most famously, explain the development of art practices (the representational art more 
specifically) precisely by such trial-and-error learning also called a “making-and-matching” 
process. 
This example could be a challenge to a theory of creativity that would rely on higher order 
processes; on the other hand, it would serve well the enactive approach since, after all, it 
does exemplify a transaction with a given environment. Noë would reject without doubt 
examples like these on account of the disregard for higher-order process such as “thought, 
communication, understanding or meaning” that he necessarily takes to play a role in art 
production (Noë, 2015, pp. 233-234), thus leaving it unclear as to whether he does subscribe 
after all to a form of representationalism.
In the introduction I have claimed that Alva Noë’s enactive approach might have more 
affinities with the theories he criticizes than he would like to admit. One of such theories is 
precisely Onians’s natural history of art or “neuroarthistory.
Here are some general characteristics of the natural history of art:
• it gives nature “not an incidental but central role in the shaping of culture and especially 
artistic culture” (Onians, 2011, p. 79). 
The “nature” referred to is related to 
6  Onians explains the same phenomenon as follows: “An unconscious feedback process could thus lead to the 
production of a highly naturalistic representation or artwork, without any teaching, guiding or other social 
stimulation. A naturalistic image might be produced completely spontaneously, due to nothing more than the normal 
operation of the human neural make-up” (Onians, 2007, p. 314).




1) human biology 
2) physical geography
1. Firstly, the notion of “nature” refers to human biology and psychology and its role in the 
shaping of artistic practices (e.g. the physiology of the eye and our use of the sense of sight, 
reference to neural architecture and the particularities of brain’s formation etc.) What is 
problematic here is to know whether there is a historicity of such cognitive capacities, for 
instance whether there is a “history of seeing” (Onians, 1996, p. 207), of visual experience as 
such, or whether this logic of development applies only to perceptual displays that become 
more and more complex due to new techniques increasing manual and representational 
skills. Noë, for instance, argues that art productions based on such techniques literally “alter 
the way we see” (Noë, 2015, p. 233), following the lead of art historians who pleaded for the 
art’s potential to give rise to perceptual learning (p. 231). Most famous is Michael Baxandall’s 
concept of “period eye”, which relies on the assumption that the history of art changes 
in response to visual preference among viewers (Onians, 2005, p. 109), these changes and 
evolution of visual skills being the result of social formation: “The period eye is constituted 
by the skills of discrimination one acquires by living in a culture, including perceiving the 
art in that culture, but it is totally different from zeitgeist and has none of the theoretical 
substructure. [P]eople were very quick to think if one said that people in a culture derive 
visual skills from that culture that this is a zeitgeist claim. I never persuaded Gombrich” 
(Obrist, 2008, pp. 43-45). Gombrich accused Baxandall of reintroducing with this notion “a 
world spirit” through the back door. One may ask here whether it is really the optical reality 
that changes or whether we’re dealing with it just a shift of attention to different areas of 
interest.
2. On the other hand, the notion of “nature” can also refer to the relation to the lived 
environment and to the natural materials available in this environment; in this sense art is 
told to have a natural history when considered as a modification of “physical substances” 
(Onians, 1996, p. 207), of stuff that is already there. When Noë argues that artistic practices 
arise out of a “first-level” of organized, basic activities (Noë, 2015, p. 30) which are used as raw 
materials, he may be following the same line of thought.
• With respect to the objects taken into account, the natural history of art does nor adopt a 
normative stance in the sense that it redefines and widens the notion of art so as to include 
products of material culture what were generally regarded as ethnographic material
The natural history of art no longer gives prominence to artworks or masterworks that 
enter the canon of Western art history (basically, the context of the fine arts) but considers a 
whole range of worldwide creative practices, ways of doings and man-made things that span 
a wide variety of places and times (at least 40 000 years). As Onians writes, “the complete 
range of visually interesting material culture has to be studied, from the Paleolithic to 
the present, from Portugal to the Ukraine, from folk crafts to palace decoration, and from 
artists’ sketchbooks to consumer videos”(Onians, 1996, p. 207). Note here the visual bias: 
not all artistic activities have to be absorbed by visual studies. There is no use in replacing a 
hegemonic model (the linguistic one) by another. 
• A more down-to-earth characteristic of the natural history of art is that the ideal of 
studying art as a worldwide phenomenon is not, or not only, a fantasy of philosophers or 
of unorthodox art historians but is implemented at the institutional level: we can mention 
here the School of World Art Studies and Museology at the University of East Anglia in 
Norwich that opens its doors in 1992; since 2003 there is also a program of World Art 
Studies at Leiden University, Netherlands (Van Damme, 2012, pp. 219-220). That being 
said, the transformation of the art history department of the University of East Anglia into 
World Art Studies was triggered by a collection of objects (Onians, 1996, p. 206) belonging 
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to a broad spatiotemporal frame and not by some predetermined conceptual convictions or 
desiderata of the faculty members. 
• Finally, another characteristic of the natural history of art is that it aspires to establish 
“disciplinary metalanguage” (Morphy, 2006, p. 12) by bringing together specialists in art 
history, anthropology, archaeology, cultural studies, evolutionary cognitive psychology 
etc.
The general methodology on which the natural history of art is based is described in Onians’s 
most recent book; it comprises the following phases:
• identifying an artistic behavior, whether this is a new form or subject in painting, a 
composition or expression in sculpture, a material or configuration in architecture, a  
bodily disposition in the working artist or an implicit response on the part of the viewer
• finding out about the material and social environment of the individual or individuals 
engaged in the behavior
• establishing which of those individuals’ visceral concerns might have been so over-riding 
that they could have had a salient impact on their neural formation
• relating those saliences of neural formation to the salient aspects of the art-related 
behavior under investigation
• exploring how a knowledge of the relationship we have inferred between neural formation 
and that particular behavior adds to, or changes, our understanding of it (Onians, 2016, pp. 
16-17)
This lengthy passage shows that Onians lays heavy emphasis on inborn, universal adaptations 
while deliberately downplaying conscious mental phenomena. This would be the “subpersonal 
level”, in Noë’s terms (2015, p. 7). Yet, cognitive phenomena pertaining to cognitive 
psychology are all-pervasive in his writings despite his tendency to reduce psychology to 
neurophysiology: take, for instance, his understanding or passive exposure, meant to explain 
differences in art, which he describes as follows: “Looking at anything with particular 
attention causes the development of neural networks that will help us better deal with it in 
the future, and this results in the formation of visual preferences that will unconsciously 
influence us should we start to make or look at art. Thus the knowledge of what precisely 
people anywhere and at any time were looking at intently will reveal a great deal about their 
preferences”(Onians, 2004, p. 12, emphasis added). What Onians says here is that the more 
we are exposed to a particular object in our visual field, the better we will get at looking at 
it and dealing with it. Some explanations in terms of mere exposure are improbable or at 
least in need of empirical grounding, such as the claim that the spreading of ink in Chinese 
painting across a sheet of (rice) paper is causally linked to the irrigation of rice soils. In this 
example, according to Onians, passive exposure to the natural environment would be causally 
linked to a specific brushstroke (Onians, 2006, p. 534). But there is another difficulty with this 
extreme externalist view which holds that interaction with an environment blindly drives 
stylistic, representational and affective choices in art making and aesthetic appreciation. 
Namely, reference to attention may be problematic for explaining passive exposure, since 
passive exposure is considered to be an automatic process, operating below the threshold of 
consciousness while attention operates generally at a conscious level. We can see here not 
only an ambiguous position toward (cognitive) psychology but also a possible misreading of 
neuroscience principles.
Now, where does Noë’s enactive approach fit into all this? To the extent that it places 
such emphasis on the extended bounds of cognition and on the transactions with the 
environment, his approach could be regarded as a transformed version of neuroarthistory, 
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equally externalist,7 and true, operating at a less visceral level, but then we should 
need to learn what exactly that level might be. If it is the embodiment level, we still 
need an explanation of how this level is connected to experience and reflected in the 
phenomenology of the individual. Unlike Onians, who tries to limit his claims to the causal 
relation between environment and unconscious processes, Noë seems to hold that there 
is a constitutive relation between environment, bodily skills and perceptual experience 
(Block, 2005, pp. 264-265). This thesis is yet to receive thorough analysis especially in the 
context of art perception. In a reply to Carroll (Noë, 2017, p. 242; Carroll, 2017, p. 218), 
Noë argues for instance that art is “not confined to reflexive phenomenology”, so I would 
assume that whatever happens at the embodiment level is subject to being accounted 
for in pre-reflexive phenomenological terms. But then how could this be compatible 
with the hierarchy of levels that Noë establishes in order to distinguish ordinary, first-
order activities from artistic, second-order activities, since ordinary perception (Noë, 
2004, pp. 29-30) is also considered to take place at an embodiment level? What would the 
phenomenology of art perception look like at the embodiment level as compared to the 
phenomenology of perception tout court? 
Furthermore, it seems that Noë presents an ambiguous position with respect to the role of 
perception in aesthetic appreciation. On the one hand, he claims that one of the limits of 
neuroscience, and in particular neuroaesthetics, is that it focuses on the ability to perceive, 
which may be irrelevant to the question of valuation of art (pp. 95-97), but on the other hand, 
he offers a taxonomy of ways of seeing, which is meant to illuminate the phenomenology of 
aesthetic appreciation. The details of this taxonomy could also be questioned: for instance, 
how could “aesthetic seeing” qualify at the same time as “detached” and self-conscious, pre-
reflective and “thoughtful”, “contemplative” and “evaluative” (pp. 51-52, 55)? In order to 
avoid any inconsistency, an option would be to read his taxonomy between “wild seeing” and 
“aesthetic seeing” (pp. 51-52) metaphorically, as designing two types of attitude (engaging 
attention in different ways and to different degrees), rather than distinct visual processes. 
Further analysis should be made in this regard since, after all, it does no justice to art practices 
to assume that we are experiencing them through alien capacities. 
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